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the appellant's release from prison he assisted in procuring
a parole for Jette. Thereafter the appellant went to workon
the Montana farm where Jette lived with his family. The
families of the two men discovered their improper relations
and apparently Jette placed the entire blame on the appellant.
This and the asserted threat of Jette to commit similar acts
on' the appellant's wife and stepdaughter, then living in
Alaska and Texas respectively, were advanced by hiin as the
motivating force leading to the homicide. He admitted that
he followed Jette to this state and killed him by placing a
can of cyanide poison used in exterminating rodents, in his
cabin. He then :fled but was Soon apprehended.
The appellant testified at length concerning the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and in imposing sentence the judge said: "In this case the defendant
is a sexual pervert. He has already killed two men." But
he also commented at length upon the evidence and stated
that there were no mitigating circumstances which would
justify a life sentence. True, he did say: "Life imprisonment is practically a joke, fifteen years at the outside." This
language is unjudicial but there can be no question that it
was intended to express a view that a life sentence with the
possibility of parole within a few years was not a sufficient
punishment for the crime which had been committed. Among
other things, the judge said that "the ,only argument in his, '
favor, that is to say why the death penalty should not be imposed, is apparently that he has pleaded guilty and saved the
county some expense. . . . There is nothing in the evidence to
indicate to me that he would Come out cured or any better. He
would still be of an age when he might commit those acts with
other people and might take' other people's lives. .'. . "
It is, therefore, apparent that although the judge was mistaken in his statement concerning the previous crime committed by the appellant, the death sentence was not imposed
for that reason but because, in his opinion, the evidence did
not justify punishment by imprisonment for what might be
a term much less than life.
The judgment is affirmed.
Traynor, J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.
OARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance.
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[L. A. No. 17365. In Bank.-April 28, 1941.]

Estate of ELLA M. HENDERSON, Deceased. BESSIE
PECK"Executrix, etc., Respondent; v. EASTERN STAR
HOMES OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Appellant;
LEON McGARY et al., Heirs and Respondents.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

Oharities-n.efinitions-Requisites~Beneficiaries, etc.-What
are Oharitable Oorporations-Test.-A bequest is charitable
if: (1) It is made for a charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of religious, educational, political or general social interest to mankind. (2) The ultimate recipients
constitute either the community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite portion thereof. The charitable nature of
an institution is determined on the same basis.
Id.-Particular Bequests-Indigent, or Dependent PersonsAged-Eastern Star Homes.-A bequest to the Eastern Star
Homes, Inc., to be used by the trustees in such manner as may
be most beneficial to the home and its inmates, is for a charitable purpose within Probate Code, sections 41, 43, even though
. indigence is not a requirement for admission.
Id.-Benefit not to Relieve Poverty.-Relief to poverty is
not a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable
purpose exists. The supplying of care and attention to aged
is as much a charitable purpose as relief of their financial
wants.
Evidence - Judicial ' Notice - Applicability of Principles----In
General-Nonfinancial Oare Required 'by Aged.-It is a matter, of common knowledge that aged people require 'care and
attention apart from financial assistance.
Oharities-Particular Bequests-Indigent or Dependent Person~Payment for Care as F: ~tor.-A bequest to the Eastern
Star Homes is none the less charitable although upon admission inmates must assign their assets to the home. A gift or
trust to support an institution beneficial to the community is
charitable even though the inmates must pay fees or contribute
to the expenses of its maintenance, so long as the income de~
rived is used only to, maintain theinstitutioil and. for some
other charitable purpose.

S. See 5 Oal. Jur. 24; 10 Am. Jur. 621.
McK. Dig. References: 1,6. Charities, § 1; 2,3,5. Charities, § 19;
4. Evidence, § 18; ,7. Mutual Benefit Societies, §, 1; 8. Charities,
§ 25 j 9. Charities, § 10.
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[6] Id.-Definitions-Requisites_Gifts to Noncharitable Organiza~
tion-Support by Assessments as Factor.-The nature of a
gift to an organization by an outsider as being for charitable
pUrposes is not necessarily determined by the status of the
donee; a charitable gift may be made to anoncharitable institution if the purpose of the gift is charitable. And so
the fact that "Eastern Star Homes" is supported by annual assessments on members' of the Order of Eastern
Star does not affect the charitable nature of a bequest to the
Homes for care of the aged. (Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159,
187 Pac. 428, criticized.)
[7] Mutual Benefit Societies - Definition, Nature and ObjectBenefits as Matter of Right.-A true mutual benefit association
is based upon reciprocal contracts and requires that a member
receive benefits as a matter of 'right. Such an organization is
distinct from one in which the member receives benefits because his case is deserving, not because previous contributions
have given him a contractual right thereto.
[8] Oharities - Beneficiaries; etc. - Beneficiaries-Oertainty_Re_
stricted Admission to Rome.-It is not essential that every
member of the community be a direct beneficiary of a charitable gift. A charity may be validly restricted to an indefinite
class· withIn the community so long as the class is large enough
to make the enforcement of the gift beneficial to the community. The aged members of the Eastern Star Homes constitute a class of beneficiaries indefinite enough to render a
bequest for their care charitable. And this is true although
admission is restricted to members· who have been affiliated
with the California order for 10 years, and have reached the
age of 65, where by virtue of restrictions on number of admittees from each chapter the beneficiaries are indefinite.
[9] Id.-Restrictions upon Amount of Bequests-In General.-Probate Code, section 41, restricts the amount of a charitable
bequest to one-third of the testator's" estate," not the" residue" of the estate.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
A~gab:dte & Elver for Appellant.

Lawrence Edwards and Charles H. Epperson for Respondent Heirs.
No appearance for Respondent Executrix.
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TRAYNOR, J.~On September 23, 1937, Ella M. Henderson died leaving a will executed on June 11, 1937, which
provided, for a: specific legacy of $500 to Bessie· M. Peck and
bequeathed the' residue of the estate to the Eastern Star
Homes of California ' 'to be used by the trustees in such
manner as may be most beneficial to the Home and its inmates". The will was admitted to probate and Bessie Peck
was 'appointed executrix of the estate which consists of personal property appraised at $16,229.04. At the request of
Leon McGary, a nephew and one of the heirs-at-law of _deceased, the executrix instituted this proceeding to determine
which persons were entitled to share in the distribution of
the estate. The trial court held that the Eastern Star Homes
was a non-profit charitable organization under sections 41 and
43 of the Probate Code. These sections provide that a devise
or bequest to a charitable corporation or to a person in trust
for charitable uses under a will executed less than six months
prior to the death of the testator cannot exceed one-third of
the entire estate if there are surviving heirs who would otherwise take the excess over one-third. The court concluded that
Bessie Peck should receive the sum of $500; the ,Eastern Star
Homes should receive only one-third of the residue of the
estate; and the nephews, nieces, and other relatives of the
deceased should receive the other two-thirds of the residue.
Judgment was entered accordingly. The Eastern Star Homes
has appealed.
The respondent executrix has taken the position that she
is a neutral party and not called upon to contest the 'appeal
of the Eastern Star Homes. She consequently has filed no
brief nor made any appearance in opposition to the appeal.
Certain of the heirs of the deceased, however, to whom distribution of a portion of the residue of the estate has been
'ordered, have been granted leave to appear and have filed
a brief in opposition to that' of appellant.
The Order of the Eastern Star in the State of California is
,an unincorporated fraternal organization consisting of approximately 96,000 members affiliated in 492 subordinate
chapters located within the state. Membership in the Order
, is limited to those persons elected by the Order from among
Master Masons, their wives" and certain other female relatives. In addition to an initiation fee, each member pays
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annual dues and assessments levied by the Grand Chapter,
the governing body of the Order in this state, and by the
local chapter with which the member is affiliated. In 1930 the
Grand Chapter organized the Eastern Star Homes of' California, a non-profit corporation and appellant herein, for the
following purpose: "To own, control, conduct and manage
homes for the care, maintenance and support of aged, indigent or infirm members of the Order of the Eastern Star".
Appellant maintains such a home in Los Angeles. The laws
of the Grand Chapter and the by-laws of the corporation provide that admission to the Home shall be restricted to members of the Order selected by appellant's board of trustees
who: (1 ) have been nominated by their local chapter; (2)
have been members in good standing of the Order of the
Eastern Star in the State of California for not less th[!,n 10
years; (3) are 65 years of age; and (4) are in reasonably
good health. Upon admission to the Home each member is
required to assign all of his assets to the appellant.
The average yearly cost of operating the Home is $30,000,
80 per cent of which is derived from annual assessments
levied by the Grand Chapter upon members of the Order
and the remaining 20 per cent principally from income on
investments. Appellant's only other income is $500 a year
from its endowment' fund.
If the bequest in question constitutes a gift to a charitable
institution or a gift in trust for charitable uses, it is invalid
to the extent that it exceeds the one-third limitation imposed
by section 41 of the Probate Code, the will having been
executed within six months prior to the death of the testatrix.
The present bequest sets up a trust for the benefit of the
inmates of the Home. It is made to the Eastern Star Homes,
Inc., "to be used by the trustees in· such manner as may be
most beneficial to the Home and its inmates". Thus, the
trustees, the beneficiaries, and the trust purpose are all stated.
Such bequests, even though made directly to an association,
are generally construed to constitute trusts' for the benefit of
the inmates if the bequests are charitable in nature. (Estate
of McDole, 215 Cal. 328 [10 Pac. (2d) 75]; Estate of De
Mars, 20 Cal. App. (2d) 514 [67 Pac. (2d) 374]; Estate of
McCray, 204 Cal. 399 [268 Pac. 647] ; Estate of Upham, 127
Cal. 90 [59 Pac. 315]1 Rest., Trusts, sec. 397 (f).)

[1] A bequest is charitable if: (1) It is made for a
charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of religious, educational, political or general social interest to
mankind. (People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [45 Pac. 270,
35 L. R. A. 269] ; Estate of Merchant, 143 Cal. 537 [77 Pae.
475].) (2) The ultimate recipients constitute either the
community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite
portion thereof. (People v. Cogsioell, supra; Estate of Hinckley,58 Cal. 457; Fay v. Howe, 136 Cal. 599 [69 Pac. 423].)
The charitable nature of an institution is determined on the
same basis.
[2-4] The bequest in the present case was clearly made
for a charitable 'purpose. Since the enactment of the Statute
of Charitable Uses during the reign of Elizabeth, aid to the
aged and infirm has been recognized as charitable. (See
cases cited in 5 Cal. Jur. 24.) Relief of poverty is not a
condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred
has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable purpose
exists. (Rest., Trusts, secs. 368, 374; People v. Cogswell,
supra; Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641 [266 Pac. 526]; 16
Cal. Law Rev. 478.) Thus, gifts or trusts for educational
institutions (Rest., Trusts, sec. 370; People v. Cogswell,
supra), the ,promotion of woman's suffrage (Garrison v. Little,
75 Ill. App. 402), the publishing of religious writings (Rest.,
Trusts, sec. 371; Estate of Graham, 63 Cal. App. 41 [218 Pac.
84] ; see 16 Cal. Law Rev. 478 at 482), and even for the relief
of. dumb animals (Estate' of Coleman, 167 Cal. 212 [138 Pac.
992, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 682]; Rest., Trusts, sec. 374 (c) ),
have been held charitable. It is a matter of common knowledge that aged people require care and attention apart from
financial assistance, and the supply of this care and atten~
tion is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as the
relief of their financial wants. Every civilized community
must provide facilities, either public or private, for the care
of old people regardless of financial condition, and a bequest
to such an institution to further its purposes is of enough
social value to be designated as charitable. (See Estate of
Friedma'n, 171 Cal. 431 [153 Pac. 918] ; Estate of Peabody,
154 Cal. 173 [97 Pac. 184]; Rest., Trusts, secs. 368-374.)
The articles of incorporation of appellant Home indicate
that it was created for the purpose of rendering assistance
to the deserving aged. A bequest to it may therefore be'
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charitable even though indigence is not a requirement for
admission.
[5] Appellant points out that upon admission an inmate
must assign his assets to the Home. The value of such an assignment is not necessarily commensurate with the benefits
derived by him from the Home. But even if each inmate were
required to pay in full for his care, a bequest to the institution
may still be charitable. A gift or trust to support an institution beneficial to. the community is charitable even though
the inmates must pay fees or contribute to the expense of
maintaining the institution so long as the income thus derived
is used only to maintain the institution or for some other
charitable purpose. (Rest., Trusts, sec. 376 (c); Dingwell
v. Seymour, 91 Cal. App. 483 [267 Pac. 327] ; Estate of Peabody, 154 Cal. 173. [97 Pac. 184].) Thus students at a
private school may be required to pay tuition fees to cover
the cost of their instruction; yet a gift to such a school for
the purpose of assisting in the education of· its students is
clearly charitable.· (Estate of Bailey, 19 'Cal. App. (2d)
135 [65 Pac. (2d) 102]; People v. Oogswell, supra; Estate
of Bartlett, 122 Cal. App. 375 [10 Pac. (2d) 126]; Rest.,
Trusts, sec. 370.) Appellant cites a number of decisions
denying a charitable status to fraternal orders, lodges, ·and
kindred organizations. (Bangor v. Rising Virtue etc. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428 [40 Am. Rep. 369] ; Mason v. Perry,
22 R. I. 475 [48 At!. 671] ; Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 151
[28 Am. Doc. 650].) These cases have rio bearing on the
present one. The gift here is not to the Order of the Eastern
Star but to the Eastern Star Homes, Inc., a corporation devoted exclusively to caring for the aged, and it is not a general fraternal contribution but was made expressly for the
charitable purpose of aiding the aged.
[6] The support of the Home by annual assessments on
members of the Order of the Eastern Star likewise does not
destroy the charitable nature of the bequest. Appellant cites
Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159 [187 Pac. 428] , Brown v. La
Societe Francaise, etc., 138 Cal. 475 [71 Pac. 516] , and Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531, f.or the proposition that a mutual
benefit society, each member of which pays. fixed periodic
sums into a common fund which is used to render medical or
other assistance to any member in need thereof, does not constitute· a charitable organization. Appellant contends that
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it is just such a non-charitable mutual benefit society organized for the protection of the members of the Order of the
Eastern Star and that a bequest to it is therefore not charitable. Appellant, however, overlooks the fact that the nature
of the bequest is not necessarily determined by the status of
the organization to which it is made. A charitable gift may.
be made to a non-charitable institution so long as the purpose
of the gift remains charitable. (Estate of Willey, 128 Cal.
1 [60 Pac~ 471] ; Powers v. Home for Aged Women, 58 R. I.
323 [192 AtL 770, 110 A. L. R. 1361].) The cases of Gorman
v. Russell and Brown v. La Societe Francaise, etc., were concerned solely with the charitable or non-charitable status of
certain organizations and not with the question of whether.a
gift to such organizations by an outsider might be a charitable
one. In the Gorman case a group of longshoremen formed a
society, each member of which contributed to a common fund
which was used to assist members who became sick or disabled.
Certain individuals who were expelled from the organization
brought suit for dissolution and distribution of the funds,
claiming the organization was no more than a private partnership.. The defendants contended the society was a charitable one and that therefore the funds belonged not to the
individual members but to the ultimate beneficiaries. The
court held the organization to be non-charitable. In the
Brown case a patient who was negligently treated in a hospital maintained by a mutual benefit society for the assistance
of its members brought suit against the hospital. The hos:"
pital contended that it was a charitable institution and therefore not liable under the rule of respondeat superior for the
negligent acts of its servants. The court held it to be noncharitable. In Estate of Dol the question was squarely pre
sented whether a bequest to a mutual benefit society organized
to render medical aid· to its members was charitable. The
court, however, held on· the basis of the Brown and Gorman
cases that the bequest was not charitable because the organization itself was not a charitable one. It failed to consider
in any way whether the gift was charitable in nature despite
the status of the organization, overlooking the fact that the
Brown and Gorman cases on which it relied were not at all
concerned with the charitable nature of gifts.
If a group of individuals agree to contribute equal amounts
into a fund to be used for the benefit of all, such a group may
4
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well be said to be non-charitable in nature because each individual is providing only for his own welfare and does not
intend to make a free contribution toward the assistance of
others. If an outsider, however, receiving no benefits from
the organization, makes a gift to it, that gift. may well be a
charitable· one if the members of the organization are sufficiently numerous and it is organized for a purpose beneficial
to society such as providing for medical assistance to its mem- '
bers. Such a donor has the charitable purpose of assisting
those members of a large group who become sick, without any
benefit to himself, and the gift thus may be a charitable one.
In the present case, therefore, even if the Home itself be
considered in the nature of a mutual benefit society and hence
non-charitable, the bequest to the Home, being for the purpose of aiding the aged, may remain charitable.
[7] A true mutual benefit aS8ociation, however, is based
upon reciprocal contracts and requires that a member receive
benefits as a matter of right. Members of the Order of the
Eastern Star who pay their required assessments acquire no
right, contractual or otherwise, to be admitted to the Home,
even after fulfilling the entrance requirements. A member
must be nominated by his local chapter and selected by the
trustees of the Home before he can gain admittance, and only
one member out of every 500 in a local chapter can acquire
residence in the Home' at the same time. A member is admitted to the Home because his case is deserving and not because his previous contributions have given him a contractual
right to admission. Thus, there is a clear distinction between
this type of organization which has a charitable purpose and
a mutual benefit society. Many decisions sustain the charitable nature of institutions established to render aid to the
members thereof -who need assistance even though the institutions are supported by contributions from the members.
(Spiller v. Maude, 32 Oh. D. 158 (1881); Pease v. Pattison,
32 Oh. D. 154 (1886); In re Buck, 2 Oh. 727 (1896); In re
Lacy, 2. Ch. 149 (1899); Morrow v. Smith (Re Wilson),145
Iowa 514 [124 N. W. 316, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1188, 26 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 696]; Plattsmouth Lodge, etc., v. Cass County, 79
Neb. 463 [113 N. W. 167.]; De la Pole v. Broughton, 118
Wash. 395 [204 Pac. 15] ; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,. vol. 2,
pp. 1122-1126; Rest., Trusts, sec. 369.) The bequest to ap-
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pellant was therefore made for a charitable purpose and to
an institution with a charitable purpose.
[8] There remains the question whether the aged members of the Order for whose welfare the Home was established
constitute a class of beneficiaries indefinite enough to render
the bequest or the institution to which it was made charitable.
It is not essential that every member. of the community be a
direct beneficiary of a charitable gift. .A charity may be
validly :restricted to an indefinite class within the community
so long as the class is large enough to make the enforcement
of the gift beneficial to the community. (Rest., Trusts, sec.
375.) In the case of bequests for the relief of poverty,
or the advancement of education, or religion, or the promotion of health, inclusive of the care of the aged, the number
of beneficiaries need not be so large as when the gift is' simply
for the gelleral benefit of a class without indication of the
particular purpose fo-r which it is to be used. (Rest., Trusts,
sec. 375 (a).) . Thus gifts and trusts to eleemosynary institutions whose benefits are restricted to members in a particular organization have been held charitable. (Estate of
Halm, 196 Cal. 778 [239 Pac. 307] ; Estate of Bailey, 19 Cal.
App. (2d) 135 [65 Pac. (2d) 102]; Spiller v. Maude, 32 Oh.
D. 158 (1881); Pease v. Pattinson, 320h. D. 154 (1886);
In re Buck, 2 Oh. 727 (1896) ; In re Lacy, 2 Oh. 149 (1899);
City of IndianapoUs v. Grand Master, 25 Ind. 518; Duke v.
Fuller, 9 N. H. 536 [32 Am. Dec. 392] ; Morrow v. Smith (Re
Wilson), supra; Most Worshipful Grand Lodge v. Board of
Review, 281 Ill. 480 [117 N. E. 1016]; Roberts v. Corson,
.79 N. H. 215 [107 Atl. 625]; State v. Toney, 141 Or. 406
[17 Pac. (2d) 1105] ; Masonic Education and Charity Trust
v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 320, [87 N. E. 602] ,; City of
Petersburg v. Petersburg Benevolent Mechanics' Assn., -78
Va. 431; De la Pole v. Broughton, supra; Scott on Trusts,
vol. 2, pp. 2022-2028; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, vol. 2,
pp. 1106, 1107; Rest., Trusts, 369.) Gifts and trusts designed to aid the poor, the aged, and the unfortunate have
been sustained as charitable although the beneficiaries are
limited to the widows and orphans of thedeceasedmembers of particular organizations, including fraternal' orders. (Estate of Willey, 128 Oal. 1 [60 Pac. 471]; Estate of Upham, 127 Oal.90 [59 Pac. 315]; Guilfm'lv.
Arthur, 158 Ill. 600 (41 N. E. 1009]; Wido'ws and Orphans
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Home, 'etc., v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 386 [103 S. W. 354, 16
L. R. A. (N. S.) 829]; Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H. 536. [32 Am.
Dec. 392]; Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge, 87 Tenn. 668 [11
S. W. 825, 4 L. R. A. 699] ; City of Petersburg v. Petersburg
Benevolent Mechanics' Assn., 78 Va. 431; De la Pole v.
Broughton, 118 Wash. 395 [204 Pac. 15]~)
Appellant points out that· admission to the Home is restricted to members of the Eastern Star who have been
affiliated with the California Order for 10 years and have
reached the age of 65 years and contends therefore that the
number of beneficiaries is definitely fixed since their identity
can be ascertained by an examination of the Order rolls. This
argument assumes that the Home exists solely for the benefit
of members who are at present able to fulfill the requ.irements
for admission. The Order of the Eastern Star, however, is a
constantly changing group. The Home exists not only for
the benefit of members now eligible for admission but also
for the benefit of members who at present lack the entrance
qualifications and persons who will join the Order in the
future. An inspection of the records therefore will not disclose all of the class to be benefited. In addition, appellant's
articles of incorporation limit each local chapter to one resident in the Home for each 500 members in the Chapter. This
restriction operates to exclude from the Home many members
possessing t~e required qualifications for admission and renders the beneficiaries even more indefinite.
[9] Section 41 of the Probate Code restricts the amount of
.a charitable bequest to one-third of the testator's estate. The
trial court in the present case restricted the amount of the
bequest to appellant to one-third of the residue of the testator's estate. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to modify its
decree by awarding to appellant an amount equal toone-third
of the testator's estate, neither party to recover costs on appeal.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.
CURTIS, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
From the findings of the court it appears that the Eastern
Star Homes was organized as a non-profit corporation under
the provisions of section 593 of the Civil Code by the Grand
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Chapter of the State of California of the Order of Eastern
Star. Its articles of incorporation state that the purpose of
its organization is "to own, control, conduct and manage
homes, hospitals and asylums for the care, maintenance and
support of aged, indigent or infirm members of the Order of
the Eastern Star". The by-laws of the corporation restrict
admission to the IIome to members of the Order of the Eastern
Star who have been in good standing for not less than ten
years. The Home is maintained and supported by dues and
assessments levied against members of said Order. No person
not a member of said Order has ever been admitted as a
resident of said Home. It thus appears that only those persons who have contributed toward the support of said IIome
for a long period of time are entitled to the privileges of said
IIome, and such contributions are practically the sole support of the Home. Is such an organization a charitable· or
benevolent society or corporation within the meaning and
intent of section 41 of the Probate Code?
In the case of Brown v. La Societe Francaise, etc., 138 Cal.
475 [71 Pac; 516], the question before the court was whether
or not the defendant was a charitable institution. In passing
upon that question, the court held· that it was not such an
organization and, for reason of so holding, stated at page 477:
"From the by-laws of the defendant, of date May 10, 1854,
it appears that the society was originally organized as a voluntary association, but was afterwards incorporated by the
filing of a certificate of· election of trustees,June 7, 1854
(Hittell's Gen. Laws, art. 1024) ; and on May 5, 1895, new
by-laws were adopted. From these it appears that 'the
society is established on the basis of mutuality for .the treatment of sick members, ' or, as more specifically provided, for
the purpose of s~curing to its members (without payment
otherwise than of dues ) medical and surgical treatment, including the services of its physicians, surgeons, apothecaries,
dentists, nurses, etc., and also medicines. Nor do we find in
it any provision for assistance to others, except to paying
patients, or sick persons not members admitted to treatment
for agreed compensation. It is therefore merely an association for mutual profit or benefit, similar in its essential nature
. to other societies formed for such purposes. (Gorman v.
Russell, 14 Cal. 531 ;18 CaL 688; Donnelly v. Boston Catholic
Cemetery, 146 Mass. 166; Ooe v. Washington Mills, 149 Mass.
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547; Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle, 151 [28 Am. Dec. 650] ; Texas
and Pac. Coal Co. v. Connaughton [Connaughten], 20 Tex.
eiv. App. 642 [50 S. W. 173].)"
In the Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159 [187 Pac. 428], an appeal
was taken from an order distributing the sum of $5,000 to a
hospital located in Los Angeles, and the name of which and
the purpose of its organization were practically the same as,
those of the defendant in the Brown case. The court held that
the two organizations were so similar that the later case was
controlled by the decision in the earlier case, that the respondent in the case then before the court was not a charitable or
benevolent society or corporation as these terms were used in
section 1313 of the Civil Code (now in part re-enacted in section 41 of the Probate Code), and that the bequest to it was
not limited by the provisions of said section of the code. In
the discussion of the question of the charitable character of
the defendant therein, Mr. Justice Shaw at page 163 of the
Estate of Dol expressed the view of the court as follows:
" . . . The same principle is stated in Gorman v. Russell,
14 Cal. 531. Referring to an organization known as the
'Riggers and Stevedores Union Association of San Francisco,'
which was unincorporated, the court said that it was a'voluntary associa.tion formed for the benefit of the members of it,'
and further, that 'a number of the members of a particular
avocation meet for mutual benefit and protection and prescribe rules for the government of the society thus organized.
They agree that each shall contribute a certain fixed sum to
the common treasury, and that the sum shall be applied, in
a certain event, as in sickness, etc., to the relief of the necessities or wants of the individual members or of their families.
This is not a charity 'any more than an assurance society
against fire, or upon life, is a charity. It is simply a fair and
reciprocal contract among the members to pay certain amounts
in certain contingencies, to each other, out, of a common fund. '
The fact that the society there involved was unincorporated
makes no essential difference. The members of the corporation here involved are interested therein substantially in the
same way as the members of a voluntary association or partnership formed for the same object are interested. No sound
distinction exists on this ground. In each case the arrangement partakes of the nature of a contract whereby, for the
dues and fees agreed upon and paid, the members receive
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the medical treatment to be given by the association at the
expense of the common fund thus accumulated. Such a society, whether incorporated or not, is not doing charitable
work, but is merely rendering the consideration agreed upon
in the contract between it and its members. "
The Estate of Dol was again before this court. On the
second occasion the question before the court was whether the
Los Angeles County Pioneer Society was a charitable society,
as that term was used in section 1313 of the Civil Code. That
society was organized for the purpose of. the collection and
preservation of data touching the early history of the state.
This court held: "Weare of the opinion that 'the respondent
is a charitable and benevolent corporation. If its only object
were to cultivate social intercourse and friendship among its
members, it would be for the benefit of the members alone
and it would not come Within that class. But it is apparent
from the reading of the part of the articles (of incorporation)
above quoted that this was but a minor part of its purposes."
(186 Cal. 64, 65 [198 Pac. 1039].)
It might be well to call attention again to the purpose -for
which the appellant, the Eastern Star Homes, was organized,
which is to maintain a home exclusively for its own members.
No person other than a member of the Order in good standing could enjoy the privileges of the Home, which was maintained and supported by dues and assessments paid by these
members.
No legal distinction may be made respecting their charitable' character between an institution founded and maintained by a society or corporation for the purpose of providing a home for its needy members and a hospital founded
and maintained for the purpose of caring for its sick or injured members, where each institution is supported and maintained by dues and assessments levied upon and paid by its
members. In each case those enjoying the privileges of the
home or hospital have paid for all the privileges and benefits received by them. In neither case does any member of
either of such institutions, enjoying the privileges and benefits of the society of which he is a member, receive anything
fDl' which he has not paid a stipulated consideration. In
the case of a member of the Order of the Eastern Star, before
she can be entitled to the benefit of the Home maintained
by that Order, she must have been a member of the Order for
U
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ten years and be in good standing at the time of making
her application for admission. That means that for that pe~
riod of time she has contributed toward the support of the
Home all dues and assessments levied by the Order. To say
that the Home is a charitable society or corporation when its
benefits and privileges are limited solely to the members of
the Order who have con:tributed definite and fixed amounts
for its maintenance and support, is contrary to all reason·
able or legal definitions of the word "charity". The decisions
above cited are contrary to any such construction and clearly
support the cbntention of appellant that the Eastern Star
Homes is not a charitable or benevolent society or corporation within the provisions. of section 41 of the Probate Code.
H Such a society," quoting from the case of Gorman v. Russell, supra, and approved and applied by this court in the
Estate of Dol, supra, "whether incorporated or not, is not
doing charitable work, but is merely rendering the consideration agreed upon in the contract between it and its members."
The respondents have cited in their brief some thirty cases
decided either by this court or by the District Courts of Appeal, which they argue support their contention that the appellant is a charitable or benevolent society or corporation.
A mere reading of these cases ,discloses. that not one of them
involves a society or co~poration whose benefits and privileges
are limited only to the paying m-embers of such organization.
It is useless to discuss these cases in any detail for the
reason that they are so wide of the mark that their inappli.
cability is apparent from. simply mentioning the name and
purpose of the particular organization to which the gift was
made. In one case, Estate of F'ried'1'fW,n, 171 Cal. 431 [153
Pac. 918], the bequest was made to the Hebrew Home for
Aged Disabled of San Francisco. It is not clear that this
Home was ever limited even to the Jewish people, but it does
plainly appear that the privileges of this Home were not
limited to the members of that group who contributed to the
maintenance of the Home, like those members of the hospital in the Dol case were doing. A number of these cases
involved gifts to educational institutions, which clearly have
no application to the question before US in the present proceeding. In other caseS the question before the court concerned bequests to churches and other religious o:rganizations.
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As churches and religious organizations are invariably held
to be charitable socIeties, the court in these last named cases.
held, in accordance with this well-established rule, that such,
bequests were charitable within. the terms of, section 1313 of
the Civil Code. The Estate of Burns, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 741
[80 Pac. (2d) 77], is also cited, but for what purpose we
are unable to determine. While the will under contest in
that case provided for a bequest to the Hollenbeck Home, a ,
charitable institution, the sole question before the court in
that case was whether the evidence of the contestants estab·
lished a prima facie case of undue influence on the part of
certain beneficiaries named in the will. This court held
that it was insufficient and affirmed the judgment of nonsuit.
It is unnecessary to consider any of the other cited cases,
as those not discussed above have no more bearing upon this
present proceeding than those we have considered.
The rule approved by the decisions of this state cited and
relied upon above is the general accepted doctrine in other
jurisdictions. In Zollmann on, Charities at section 206, it is
stated: "Mutual benefit societies exist in great numbers and,
as their name indicates, are of much benefit to their members.
... Since their benevolence begins and ends at home, they
will not receive recognition as charities ... " The author
in section 208 of the same work in discussing the status of
lodges, stated: "On reason lodges are not charities within
the meaning of the statute of Elizabeth. . . . They. are bodies
,which derive their funds not from gifts, testamentary or
otherwise, but from dues, fees and assessments, and which
have other objects. than charity, and are rather mutual benefit associations than charitable institutions. . . . A lodge of
Odd Fellows is, therefore, a mutual benefit society rather
than a charity. "
A leading case upon this subject is Bangor v. Rising Virtue
etc. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me.. 428 [40 Am. Rep. 369], in which
the question before the court was whether a Mas.onic lodge
was a charitable institution. After an extended review of the
authorities upon the subject and an analysis of the constitution, by.laws, and rules and regulations of Masonic lodges,
the court held that such a lodge was not a charitable insti.
tution. On page 436 of the opinion the court states its con.
clusion as follows: " ... Its funds are derived ... from
fees and the asses.sments of its members. The funds so ob~
tained are to be distributed among the poor and needy mem-
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bers, from whom they were collected, and among their wives
and children. It is an association for the mutual benefit of
its members, and not a charitable institution within the meaning of the statute." The statute just referred to provided
that all real and personal property of all benevolent and charitable institutions incorporated in that state should be exempt
from taxation. The court held that as the lodge was not a
charitable or benevolent institution, it was not ex-empt from
taxation under said statute.
Among the cases cited and relied upon in Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, su,pra, was the case of Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle
(Pa.), 151, 157 [28 Am. Dec. 650], wherein the charitable
character of an Odd Fellows lodge was at issue. In commenting oil that case the Supreme Court of Maine in the above decision (p. 436) observed: "In Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle [151]
157 [28 Am. Dec. 650], it was held that alodge of Odd Fellows, being an association of mutual benevolence among its
members, was not a charitable institution.... 'The association,' observes Sargent, J., in delivering the opinion of the
court, 'from whose property is the money in court, was formed
and conducted without incorporation. Its objects are stated
to be the employment of its funds in purposes of mutual
benevolence among its members and their families; but these
cannot be deemed charitable uses under the common law of
Pennsylvania, or the statute 43 Eliz.. . . '"
Respondents contend that a later case of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia v. Masonic lIome, 160 Pa. 572
[28 Atl. 954, 40 Am. St. Rep. 736, 23 L. R . .A. 545], lays
down a different rule and is in conflict with the earlier case
of Babb v. Reed, supra, but such is not the case. The Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania provided that property
of an "institution of purely public charity" was exempt
from taxation. The court in Philadelphia v. Masonic Home,
sttpra, simply held that the Masonic home, maintained by the
Grand Lodge of Masons of the ,State of Pennsylvania, was
not such an institution, as the" benefits of the Home were
limited to members of the Masonic fraternity and were not
open to the public.
In the case of In re Rathbone's Estate, 170 Misc. 1030 [11
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 506, ,at p. 529], is to be found a clear
statement as to the distinction between a beneficial and a
charitable society. It is there said: "The distinction be-
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tween a beneficial and a charitable society is clear. In the
beneficial society the world outside the association's doors
is essentially a stranger. The beneficial society is regardful
only of its members. It constitutes a group of insiders. Its
membership is formed of candidates able to satisfy onerous
conditions-financial, moral, civil, etc. The members have
been drawn together by a mutual desire to be as they are.
Once assembled they exclude all other persons from their society activities. The charitable institution is ex'actly the opposite in all the stated particulars allowing of comparison.
To a charity the world outside is a world, the inhabitants of
which should all be united as brothers. . . . The managing
members of a charitable organization expect to get nothing for
their labors. Charity seeks primarily the good of others ....
Charity is the proof of the profound paradox that to get
one must give but the giving m'U.St not be for the purpose of
getting. Every charitable use is open to the whole world
so far as is practicable."
As the appellant, the Eastern Star Homes, was founded
and is maintained for the express and sole purpose of providing a home for the members of the Order of the Eastern
Star of this state, and as the funds necessary 'for its operation and maintenance were contributed by the members of
said Order in regular dues and assessments, under the above
authorities it cannot be held to be a charitable or benevolent
corporation or society,but is, on the other' hand, a mutual
benefit association, rendering to its members benefits for an
agreed consideration under a contract between itself and its
members.
The respondents further contend that even though the appellant is not a charitable or benevolent society or corporation, that the bequest to it is for a charitable purpose and
therefore comes within the limitation placed on gifts of that
eharacter by the provisions of section 41 of the Probate Code.
In support of'this contention they cite the case of Estate of
Willey, 128 Cal. 1 [60 Pac. 471]. In that case it was contended_ that certain gifts to several Masonic bodies were invalid because these bodies were charitable societies. The
court held that even if these Masonic bodies were not charitable societies" the gifts to them were for charitable purposes
and sustained them. This decisi()n, therefore, properly may
be construed as holding that a gift or bequest may be charitable and therefore subject to the limitation placed on such
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gifts by section 41 of the Probate Gode, although the person
or society to whom the gift or bequest is made may not be a
charitable society.
As already stated, the bequest to the Eastern Star Homes
was made "to be used by the trustees in such manner as
may be most beneficial for t~e Home and its inmates". It
is presumed that the trustees will properly apply the fund
so bequeathed to them in accordance with the terms imposed
by the testatrix. (Estate of Wt1ley, supra, p. 12.) If so,
the proceeds from the gift will be applied in accordance with
the purposes of the society, as set forth in its articles of
incorporation, which we have seen are "to maintain the Home
for the members of the Order". As the purposes of the
Order of the Eastern Star are not charitable and the bequest
from the testatrix was to carry out these purposes, it cannot
be said that the bequest took on any of the characteristics
of a charitable nature. Had the bequest been made to the
Home for the care and maintenance of the children of the
members of the Order, rather than for the benefit of the
members, then there might be some legal grounds for holding it to be a gift in trust for charitable purposes, and the
case would be brought within the rule announced in the Estate of Willey, supra, where the bequest was made to certain
Masonic bodies "for the use of the widows'· and orphans'
fund of said" lodges. But it was not so made and, as made,
the only persons to be benefited by the gift were the members
of the Order who might at some time in their lives become
residents in the Home.
The accepted definition in this state of a charitable trust
is " . . . a donation in trust for promoting the welfare of
mankind at large, or of a community, or of some class forming a part of it, indefinite as to numbers and individuals."
(People v. Oogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [45 Pac. 270, 35 L. R. A.
269] ; Zollmann on Trusts, p. 140; 5 Cal. Jur. 6.)
The bequest here involved does not come within· the terms
of this definition. It was not a donation for promoting the
welfare of mankind at large, or of any community or class
indefinite in number. On the other hand, its purpose was to
promote the welfare of a class of individuals definite in number; that is, the membership of the Order of the Eastern
Star of the state. As no member of the Order is entitled to
become a resident of the Home without sh~ is in good standing in the Order and has been such for ten years prior to her
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admission, the· number of individuals whose wel£arethe bequest was designed to promote was definitely fixed, and their
.identity could be ascertained by an inspection of the records
of the Order. The bequest, therefore, was not a gift to the
Home for charitable uses, as the. members of the Order for
whose welfare the. gift was made were an ascertainable and
definite class of beneficiaries. (Zollmann on Trusts, p. 141;
Loch v. Mayer, 50 Misc. 442 [100 N. Y. StIpp. 837, 839].)
I have stated in a preceding part of this opinion that practically the sole support 9f the Eastern Star Homes came from
the annual dues and assessments levied against the members
of the Order of the Eastern Star in this state. The facts
respecting the maintenance and operation of the Home are
that the annual cost of such maintenance and operation of
the Home is $30,000. Approximately $24,000 of this amount
is from annual dues and assessments levied by the Order on
its members, and the balance of said annual cost of maintenance, except the sum of $500, is from income on investments made by the corporation from the surplus of previous
dues and assessments. Said sum of $500 per annum, the court
Iound, is income "from an endowment fund of the corporation' '. Respondents state that endowment suggests charity.
Admitting that the possession of a substantial endowment
fund is frequently taken into consideration in determining
the charitable character of an institution possessing such a
fund, we have been cited to no instance where the income from
an endowment fund so insignificant in comparison to the total
upkeep of the institution, as is the endowment income in the
present case, has ever been. seriously considered in determiningwhether such an institution is a charitable society. Here
the annual income from the endowment fund is less than
2 per cent of the annual cost of maintaining the Home, and
it cannot have the effect of determining the charitable character of the Home when the purposes of the Home and the
actual operation thereof indicate its non-charitable character.
Respondents call our attention to the by-laws of the corporation, the Eastern Star Homes, where in four instances
reference is made to the corporation as a "charity," and
contend that it is bound by such an interpretation of itself.
There is no merit in this contention. No authority is cited
.in support of this assertion of respondents, and we doubt
whether any can be found. On the other hand, the contrary
rule is followed in this state. (Stewart v. Oalifornia Medical
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etc. Assn., 178 Cal. 418, 421, 422 [176 Pac. 46] ; Stonaker v.
Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 378 [2 Pac. (2d)
520].) It would be an easy matter in those states where
charitable societies are exempt from certain taxes, for a cor~
poration organized for purely commercial purposes, to escape
taxation by stating in its articles of incorporation or in its
by-laws that its purposes were. benevolent and that it was a
charitable society, if respondents' construction of the· law
should be accepted.
I have referred to the heirs of said deceased who have
appeared herein by filing a brief in opposition to this appeal
as the respondents.
For the foregoing reasons in my opinion the judgment
should be reversed.
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